In the last twenty-five years – from 1996 to 2021 – a series of actions have marked the evolution of the economy: from transformations linked to new information and communication technologies to the Covid-19 pandemic, among other things, through to the financial and economic crisis of the second half of the first decade of the 21st century. In this article, we look at the impact of events in the last twenty-five years on economics teaching, whether this is evolving alongside the economic reality or not, what has given rise to a mismatch between economics and the social and economic reality. To analyze this, in the first section, we will tackle the social mission of the “economist” in the sense of being teachers of highly diverse collectives, and in the second section, we will reflect on the evolution of economics teaching at University. The analysis leads us to conclude that, although economics teaching has varied over time, it has not undergone substantial change in recent decades. The lack of diversity of thinking in economics curricula joins forces with a lack of diversity among prominent thinkers and professionals to often translate into an incomplete view explaining the complex economic reality and an interaction with other disciplines, particularly social sciences.

The article analyses, from a historical perspective, the geopolitics of energy in the framework of the capitalist system. The first section explains the birth of the geopolitics of energy (a geography of energy by state and the kind of energy relations between states), arguing that its birth is associated with fossil fuels and its goal is the safeguarding of supremacy through both territorial control of energy sources (or flows) and their commodification. After a brief review of the geopolitics of oil, the article ventures on what, in the present context of capitalism, the geopolitics of renewables might be. The main conclusion is that, because of the inherent features of renewables, at the end of the day the outcome will be the result of a political choice. The question is whether this choice will also be aimed at both grounding hegemony on international energy relations and funding the global unbalances of the system.

For a sustainable post-Covid-19 recovery strategy, humanity faces two major challenges: 1. Just prosperity: The creation of a resilient and fair economy that delivers prosperity for all; 2. Public and planetary health: protect human health, together with the reduction of environmental impacts below thresholds of planetary boundaries including greenhouse gas emissions. The Covid-19 crisis could represent an opportunity for responses that integrate different goals, or a drawback if some are prioritized without considering their impacts on the others. New kinds of informed solutions are needed to ensure long-term sustainability in social, economic, and environmental terms. This article addresses the research question: How could developed countries manage a sustainable recovery that provides a good life for all within public and planetary health? First, it argues that economic growth is not compatible with environmental sustainability. Green Keynesianism is based on the hypothesis that economic growth can be decoupled from environmental impacts, but this has not happened and it is unlikely to happen. Second, it introduces degrowth as an alternative to green growth. Degrowth challenges the hegemony of economic growth and calls for a democratically led redistributive downscaling of production and consumption in industrialised countries as a means to achieve environmental sustainability, social justice, and well-being. Third, it traces the recent evolution of the term degrowth from an activist slogan to an academic concept. Last, it calls for an alliance of alternatives that could foster a deeply radical socio-ecological transformation.

In the past four decades, the centre of economic power has moved from industry to finance. Against this backdrop, the financialization of the water industry has made the hydrosocial cycle more complex, witnessing the emergence of new financial logics and financing instruments. This change has thoroughly transformed the relation between infrastructures and water companies, citizens, other water users and the environment. In this article, and based on previous work, I present a summary that debates around the financialization of the water cycle, through the example of the provision and development of financialized water infrastructures in London.

The Roadmap for Moving to a low-carbon economy in 2050 states that the objective of the European Union policy for Energy and Climate is to reduce its CO2 emissions to 80 % below 1990 levels. First, the article explains that decarbonisation within this framework does not only mean a transition towards renewable energy, but also changes in the use of ‘clean’ fossil fuels, in type and location. Secondly, it shows that the investment, infrastructures and treaties proposed to carry out this transformation will lead to the creation of bigger monopolies, and to the regionalization of the European energy space. Finally, we conclude by saying that if measures to offset the power of the monopolies are not applied, the outcome of these reforms will be the creation of energy baronies.

In the last three decades, network industries have experienced major changes the world over. It can be presumed that they will continue to do so, driven by technological and economic changes and also by the campaigns of interest groups framed by institutional and ideological parameters. In the European Union these changes have seen a growing degree of involvement at the community level, without reaching the point of creating European networks. Paradoxically, this could be beneficial for the resolution of certain dilemmas that arise in an electricity sector where a European demos is not well established, a factor that is problematic in other aspects. A consolidated European demos would require a consolidated European political arena, European public with European political parties and lobbyists working at a European level, and so on. The reason this lack of development of a European demos may be favourable to sectors such as electricity or communications is that it can stop public interventions in these sectors from being made into political issues. Although the European Union has already played an important role in increasing competition in these sectors, it may play a much more important role in a future that advances towards a market that is truly integrated, in which networks of a real European scope exist.

In the last three decades, network industries have experienced major changes the world over. It can be presumed that they will continue to do so, driven by technological and economic changes and also by the campaigns of interest groups framed by institutional and ideological parameters. In the European Union these changes have seen a growing degree of involvement at the community level, without reaching the point of creating European networks. Paradoxically, this could be beneficial for the resolution of certain dilemmas that arise in an electricity sector where a European demos is not well established, a factor that is problematic in other aspects. A consolidated European demos would require a consolidated European political arena, European public with European political parties and lobbyists working at a European level, and so on. The reason this lack of development of a European demos may be favourable to sectors such as electricity or communications is that it can stop public interventions in these sectors from being made into political issues. Although the European Union has already played an important role in increasing competition in these sectors, it may play a much more important role in a future that advances towards a market that is truly integrated, in which networks of a real European scope exist.